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An Operator’s Perspective
on Ottawa’s Article 5
The Nairobi Action Plan calls upon all of us

Mine Free:

in the mine action community to “ensure
that assistance in mine action is based on

Not Anytime Soon

adequate surveys, needs analysis and costeffective approaches.”1 The purpose of this
editorial is to bring an operator’s perspective

by Richard Kidd [ United States Department of State ]

to this commitment.
by Per Nergaard [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

C

With annual victim figures drop-

M

ping towards 10,000, it is hard to
ine action is changing. This is not
make the case that landmines
1997 and what the
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international community has
learned in the past eight years
compared to the impact of other
clearly indicates that the path
issues such as HIV/AIDS, food seforward is something different
curity, malaria, etc.
from what a literal reading of
the Ottawa Convention1 would
suggest. The Landmine Impact
Survey process has demonstrated very clearly that only a
scarce resources, an unfortunate waste of funds, funds
small portion of the minefields—normally less than 20
that could save more lives and be more beneficial if appercent—account for the vast majority of casualties and
plied elsewhere.
lost economic opportunities. The mine action commuThis realization should not be taken as a critique of
nity has a responsibility to profit from this new knowlany treaty or policy position, but rather as positive tesedge and to adjust its approach accordingly.
timony to the power knowledge can have in focusing
The phrase “mine free” is an inspiring statement of
limited assets on activities where such resources will do
purpose but a poor organizing principle—given that no
the most good. Mine-affected countries and the internadonor or collection of donors, no lending institution and
tional community can work together to develop sound
no major impacted country has indicated a willingness
national strategic plans—ones that set forth achievable
to put up the huge amount of resources required to find
visions and match resources to prioritized, measurable
and clear every last mine. With annual victim figures
outcomes. As the most pressing impacts of landmines
dropping towards 10,000, it is hard to make the case that
are removed, collective efforts can shift away from largelandmines continue to be a global “scourge” compared
scale clearance activities by outside organizations, allowto the impact of other issues such as HIV/AIDS, food
ing programs with greater national ownership to come
security, malaria, etc. The initiative to “mainstream”
to the forefront. These smaller, more balanced and susmine action into development argues in favor of using
tainable programs would focus on mine risk education,
“return on investment” as a criterion for mine clearance,
marking suspected hazardous areas and limiting deminand while this return is positive in many cases, it is not
ing to only when newly discovered threats or changes in
in all.
land-use patterns create the need.
There is substantial evidence to suggest many of the
Such an approach would allow for the most rapid remines now being cleared are inert, degraded by the efduction of hazards and the lowest possible expenditure,
fects of time, temperature and moisture. Why spend
surely a desirable outcome from any perspective.
money to clear land that will not generate economic reA version of this article was originally published in the
turns and why remove mines that Mother Nature has
Nairobi Special Issue of the Landmine Action Campaign
already rendered safe? Why risk deminers’ lives to clear
Newsletter, Nov. 1, 2004, available online at http://www.
land that no one will use? Attempting to clear every
landmineaction.org/resources.asp?item=newsletter.
last mine would be, in a world of pressing demands and
See “References and Endnotes,” page 104
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ost-effectiveness in the traditional sense of the
word has many aspects and can be displayed
in many ways. Several practical examples have
been presented at various occasions involving issues like
coordination, toolboxes, complementarities of methods,
technologies, etc. I will attempt not to prod any further
into that here.
What we need to do is ask some pretty tough questions at this stage. Yet at the same time, we need to
prepare ourselves for constructive criticism and selfanalysis, a rather normal but unpleasant outcome of lessons learnt. A natural outset for these questions would be
articulated by recalling the objectives we set for ourselves
in the pursuit of mine action in the late 1980s and early
1990s, long before the Ottawa Convention2 came to be.
Even then we were talking about implementing mine
clearance operations in support of the creation and development of sustainable national structures and operations that are capable of solving the landmine problem.
The Convention was pushed through as a groundbreaking framework for the establishment of such setups, and
fundraising was time-consuming but not necessarily
very hard.
Around the same time, we made huge efforts to develop a technical framework for mine action to make it as
safe, secure and all-encompassing as possible in the wake
of internationally recognised advanced quality management mechanisms á la ISO 9000.3 Our intentions
were good back then, but, as with most prescribed medicines, it had side effects and a negative impact on our ability to obtain the overall objective of effectively ridding
the world of mines. With the benefit of this hindsight,
it is paramount that we now collectively ask ourselves
the following:
• Why is mine action still more characterized by
the provision of externally managed, too-complex
and thus pacifying mechanisms for mine action
rather than assisting in the creation of nationally
adaptable, appropriate and sustainable measures
to solve the problem?

• Why is it so difficult—even sometimes with good
impact and technical data at hand—to establish
national mine-action plans aimed at meeting the
obligations of Article 5? This means national
plans where national authorities’ initiative leads
to the full participation and commitment of the
United Nations, non-governmental organizations
and donors-in-the-making, for implementation
and support of that plan—and the ability to see
it through.
• Why are international organizations still implementing large-scale mine action operations when
we all said we would build national capacity and
ensure national ownership?
• Why aren’t the formal demobilization processes
that put thousands of former combatants to work
in the minefields undertaken in support of national planning and implementation of national
efforts? Moreover, why aren’t more regular army
units involved in post-conflict clearance as part of
a well-structured national plan?
• Why is there still a growing division between
U.N. and NGO perspectives on mine action at
both the national and international level, despite
hard attempts on both sides to find common
ground on coordination and planning of mine
action? In addition, why aren’t governments of
mine-affected countries more aware of the development of better practices on the national level?
Based on these questions, it would be fair to say that
the level of accomplishment compared to the input of
resources just is not justifiable. Furthermore, the implementation of mine action activities is now effectively
taking place outside of centrally managed bureaucracies. The established structures and mechanisms have
proven inefficient and inadequate and now need to be
challenged in order to render the higher output needed
to meet looming Article 5 deadlines.
If we are to meet the obligations of Article 5, we (national authorities in affected states, the United Nations,
NGOs—all of us involved in solving the problem of
anti-personnel landmines) need to seriously change
our approach.
While we at Norwegian People’s Aid do not have all
the answers on how to achieve a new paradigm for mine
action, we think peer pressure, active donor engagement
and goal orientation need to be communicated to all
mine action operators and mine-affected countries in
order to obtain national ownership, effective planning
and cooperation to get the job done. To achieve this, a
donor should ensure that these optimal conditions are in
place prior to granting funds. With the current trend of
shifting project and program support to that of budget
and sector support, it should also be a fundamental requirement that mine action is elaborated on in national
Continued on page 35, OTTAWA
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Donors’ needs versus community’s needs. The locality model has proven popular among partners, and
it has become an overriding objective of partners and
donors in control of funds. However, MAG has experts
on the ground to ensure the most appropriate method of
clearance is being applied to a suspect area; MAG also
knows the locality model will not always be the best
solution. Immediately targeting funds on the locality
model rather than seeking the solution best suited to the
clearance task can certainly be detrimental to the community. In a situation in which the presence of suspect
areas is hampering development activities, much speedier “area reduction” techniques could be applied to get
the job done. This is preferable to starting a lengthier
process in setting up a locality demining programme,
especially when MAG’s technical experts know manual
demining is not necessarily what the community needs.
These issues are being addressed as more donors are increasingly aware that it is not about what looks good
on paper and much more about what the community’s
needs are on the ground.
Limitations of skills. One major constraint is the
comparative inflexibility of the locality deminers. Under
normal circumstances, a MAT might undertake several
different tasks a relatively short distance from each other. For example, a development agency might be clearing
sites for construction of water pumps, and this might
require demining as well as some surface-area tasks. It is
difficult for the locality deminers to split from the group
and undertake other tasks due to the lack of additional
skills that can be found in a more experienced multiskilled deminer.
Unofficial “village demining.” Development of
skills for local people is generally seen as a positive step,
but when the employment finishes, there are concerns
villagers may be tempted to offer their services for sale
elsewhere. In other industries, this may not be an issue,
but when the work involves demining, the concern is
valid. Agencies such as MAG operate under the tightest safety operating procedures and the employee comes
under close scrutiny and care. MAG also provides insurance and the safety measures employees need in order to
carry out their work in confidence. Informal clearance
does not provide this. As much as 60 percent of all land
cleared is estimated to have been made so through informal clearance,4 so this model addresses the phenomenon
face on, with a view to ensuring quality of work as well
as maintaining levels of safety.
Villagers understand the benefits of working with a
reputable organisation. Also, by having a team located
in a particular area undertaking clearance, it is predicted
that the overall need for clearance by informal village
demining will be reduced. This aside, much informal
village demining today takes place in areas of low threat
whilst MAG aims to have locality teams in areas of
highest threat.
Team supervisors and mine action officers report a
heightened sense of awareness of the risk of mines and
believe that, due to more clearance taking place in their
area and less land presenting an immediate threat to villagers, it is debatable whether village demining will take
place. As locality deminer contracts have not yet ended,
this will be monitored further at the appropriate time.
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Ling Phanh is a locality deminer in Cambodia.

Pre-conditions for Success
It is apparent that the locality model will not replace the MAT model. From programme
experience over the last eight months or so, MAG recognises the need to complement the
locality teams with mobile MATs, Technical Survey Teams and other elements of more
traditional clearance activities.
It is also clear that management plays an important part in the success of the model, as in
most operations. Training must be rigorous and graded to lower levels of education, if appropriate. Indeed, a requirement for recruiting is a minimum standard of education, and this may
prove difficult in communities deprived of access to educational facilities over long periods.
Also, unlike MATs, it is harder to break a locality team into smaller units to undertake
tasks such as clearing sites for well-digging. The tasks must be appropriate; the site must be
able to accommodate the whole group without splitting it into smaller groups (which may
require further experienced supervision and medical coverage).
In refining the model, it was agreed that, due to the investment in training new deminers,
a period of around two years was seen as appropriate for the life of a team. A period as short as
four months, for example, would make the operation inefficient in terms of initial investment
in training. Bearing this in mind, the deployment of a locality team must be in an area with
multiple tasks to support a team over an estimated two years or more. Moreover, the area of
operations must be within easy reach by local transport; for example, in Cambodia, the trip
to work for villagers is often a 10-minute bicycle ride.
Opportunities
One of the main opportunities for expansion is the value of employment for the households engaged in the locality teams. With a certainty of employment over the forthcoming
period, there is some guarantee of income for the households. It is the challenge for development agencies working together with MAG in these areas to ensure maximum benefit that is
derived from the regular income from a job with MAG.

OTTAWA, continued from page 5
development plans and poverty-reduction strategies.
Failure to do this will leave any national potential budget line
for mine action at zero, and all activities will continue to need
external funding. Any sound investor looking for the return
of a successful implementation of the Ottawa Convention
would ensure good management, articulated objectives and
a plan for the implementation of activities to reach the goals.
Deviation reports along the way are also common in responsible management and good governance.
Similarly, mine-affected countries should draft national plans, taking into account the obligations set in
the Convention. However, some mine-affected countries
with national plans have unfortunately already placed the
goal beyond the outer perimeter of Article 5 deadlines,
articulating achievement levels lesser than those bound
by the Convention. Fortunately, the goals for every individual mine-affected country are spelled out in the text of
Article 5 and bound through the ratification or accession
to the Convention so that necessary timeline corrections
can be easily altered.
Realistic national plans faithful to these obligations
should be a clear responsibility of the States Parties.
Operators, donors and other relevant stakeholders should
take part in the development of these plans to ensure implementation and commitment to national plans.
Practically speaking, a flexile and dynamic, locally
elaborated operational work plan should thereafter balance the tasks within the timeframe and resources available. This work plan should include clearing mined areas
impeding safety, free circulation, and development as a
matter of priority and classifying those that in the meantime can do with perimeter marking, to render a safe environment in mine-affected areas until these mined areas
also must be neutralized for those 22 States Parties meeting their Article 5 deadline in March 2009.
This strategy may sound easy and fairly logical, but,
generally speaking, it simply has not been done to the extent needed in order to claim victory in 2009. The mine
action community needs the immediate attention of all
States Parties to the Convention to fundamentally correct
these things now.
see “References and Endnotes,” page 104

Many of the vulnerable households are crippled by
debt; independent loan agents lend money to households at extremely high interest rates of 100 percent
per annum and above. There is an opportunity to
maximise the earnings potential of locality deminers
through debt reconciliation; the development agency
pays off the debt of the household and in turn the
household pays back the loan at cost to the agency. In
this way, the household may eliminate debt faster than
normal so that wages paid can be concentrated on accruing benefits for the household instead of paying off
crippling loans. This is an area for further work with
development agencies and MAG in the future.
Conclusion
The locality model aims to provide more communityoriented and cost-effective action in line with MAG’s overall mission to find solutions that not only put people first
but are appropriate. Importantly, MAG has found that
it can train villagers in the core skills and, with supervision and good management, undertake demining as
effectively as long-serving, multi-skilled and better-paid
mobile teams.
It is clear the locality demining model presents a
number of clear advantages. Most notably, it helps
communities address the problem of remnants of conflict in their own backyard. Also, it is no coincidence
that staff attendance is high amongst locality deminers
because the desire to work for a steady wage is strong.
We believe that the desire to clear their own villages
also provides a keen impetus. With this programme,
MAG can look at other ways of involving communities and villagers more to give them a greater say in
prioritising which areas need to be cleared first. Where
locality demining is appropriate to the area, MAG is
making positive strides toward developing new initiatives to best serve the communities right now and for
the generations to come.
All permissions for using “ locality demining” and/or
“ locality model” and any text from this article, whether
in full or in part, must be applied for from the copyright
holder. © MAG 2005. Printed with permission.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 105
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